By Marian Wang, ProPublica
Yesterday the government's oil spill panel released a letter alleging that Halliburton knew of potential flaws in its cement prior to the Deepwater Horizon blowout. That same spill commission, in a little-noticed report
by the New Orleans Times-Picayune, had earlier this week criticized
government inspectors for their lack of knowledge about how to safely
cement an offshore well.
"When we asked about cementing and centralizers, they said very
freely, 'We don't know about that stuff; we have to trust the
companies,'" the commission's co-chairman, William Reilly, told the
Times-Picayune. "All they get is on-the-job training. It really is
fairly startling, considering how sophisticated the industry has
become."

We've
noted such problems within the Minerals Management Service -- the
regulatory agency responsible for inspecting offshore drilling
rigs -- including its shortage of inspectors, reliance on industry to self-police, and history of ethical violations, some of which occurred as recently as 2008.
Newly renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy, the agency has announced plans
to add to its current staff -- which has 64 inspectors -- by hiring 200 new
inspectors and engineers. Its head, Michael Bromwich, told the
Times-Picayune that the agency is also moving to correct deficiencies in
training:

"BOEMRE currently does not have a formal training and certification
program for its inspectors, but up until this point has relied upon
on-the-job training from more experienced inspectors," Bromwich said.
"One of the things that we are looking at implementing is a strong
bureau-wide certification or accreditation program for inspectors to
ensure that our inspectors are given the proper fundamental knowledge
and maintain proficiency with current systems and operations."
... New safety rules imposed by BOEMRE last month are the first to
require federal engineers to review cementing plans to ensure they
follow best industry practices. Under [the Minerals Management Service],
there were no federal regulations governing specific cementing
procedures.

In a letter released Thursday,
the oil spill commission alleged that Halliburton's cement
mixture -- meant to help seal the well -- was unstable. The commission also
noted that BP and Transocean personnel "misinterpreted or chose not to
conduct" subsequent tests that could have identified cementing problems.
 
As we've pointed out, BP, in its 193-page report on the Gulf
disaster, acknowledged that subsequent testing "might have enabled the
BP Macondo well team to identify further mitigation options to address risks."
Halliburton, in response to the panel's finding, issued a statement
on Thursday disputing its validity, while acknowledging that it skipped a stability test before proceeding with cementing the well. Halliburton has in the past
placed blame on BP for its risky well design. According to the
Washington Post, the commission isn't ruling those design flaws out,
and has stated in background briefings they could have been a factor in
precipitating the accident. The panel's findings regarding the cause of
the blowout are due at hearings on November 8 and 9.